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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we examine the ultimatum game’s income distribution and efficiency implications 
and modify the game to investigate the impact of re-distributional policies imposed on the parties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
t is well known that games in which there is an ultimatum can generate devastating outcomes for both 
parties.  A company‟s last contract offer to a labour union may lead to rejection and a strike, while in the 
political arena, spurning a final offer might lead to escalation of violence and even war.  Rejections of 
final offers clearly make both parties worse off.  Why then do they appear to be considerably more common in 
practice than might be anticipated? The usual explanation advanced in the literature is that offers considered unfair 
by responders to ultimata are apt to be rejected.  However, there seems to be no consensus on how fairness 
perceptions are established or on the extent to which they reflect social pressures and thus constraints on choice 
rather than inherent characteristics of objective functions.   
 
To obtain experimental evidence and motivate discussion on fairness and bargaining issues, a simple 
exercise known as the ultimatum game was devised by Guth et al (1982) and in one form or another the ultimatum 
game remains one of the most popular experiments.  To the best of our knowledge, the differences in income 
distributions and efficiency levels between the basic game and one including a social justice re-distribution of 
income scheme have to date not been explored in the literature.  To explore these issues we administered the 
ultimatum game as modified by Dickinson (2002) in our introductory microeconomics classroom.  In the present 
paper we use the results to explore the aggregate social welfare implications of the game, investigating fairness in 
terms of the income distribution that arises from the game and expanding the exercise to consider the impact of re-
distributional policies imposed on the parties. 
 
THE ULTIMATUM GAME 
 
 In the ultimatum game, individuals are paired anonymously.  One player, the “proposer,” is told to imagine 
s/he has just won a lottery (without having bought a ticket) or been given (or perhaps has just found) a specific sum 
of money and is asked by the experimenter to offer a share of the windfall to a second player, the “responder.”  Both 
proposers and responders are told that if the offer is accepted, the responder is to be given the offer amount and the 
proposer will get to keep the remainder; but if the responder rejects the offer, both players receive nothing.  
 
If the players are informed, self-interested and rational, the predicted outcome of this two-person game is 
for a positive but minimal transfer of wealth.
1
 Since rejection means that a responder is guaranteed to receive 
nothing, the one-shot equilibrium strategy is to accept any positive amount the proposer offers.  The proposer, given 
the responder‟s dominant strategy, thus will rationally offer the smallest positive amount possible.2 
                                                 
1 The unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for the proposer to offer nothing and the responder to accept this. 
2 In repeated games with individuals sometimes as responders and sometimes as proposers it would be reasonable for self-
interested behaviour to result in tit-for tat behaviour and an ultimate sharing of windfalls. 
I 
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Figure 1 illustrates the payoffs.  The proposer is given (conditionally) ten dollars and is required to make an 
offer to the responder of at least (arbitrarily) one dollar.  If the responder accepts, each receives the respective 
payout.  If the responder rejects the offer, neither receives anything.  Since the actual offer is a matter of proposer 
choice, the equal-share option is but one alternative to the minimum and is shown merely for purposes of illustrating 
the thought processes in which one would expect a proposer to engage. Nash equilibrium is shown in the top right 
hand cell with strategies for the proposer to offer the smallest possible amount (in this example, one dollar) and for 
the responder to accept that amount. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Payoffs for Proposer and Responder 
Pie Size: $10 Proposer 
 
Responder 
Strategy Share equally Share more Minimal offer 
Accept $5, $5 $7, $3 $9, $1 
Reject 0, 0 0,0 0, 0 
 
 
 Contrary to the „selfish‟ model‟s predictions, the Nash equilibrium outcome in settings such as this has 
rarely materialized in numerous experimental studies across nations, with different lottery sizes, and employing 
various experimental procedures.  The most common outcome has been for proposers to offer considerably more 
generous amounts than the minimum but rarely to equally share the pie. See for example Guth et al., (1982), Roth 
(1995) and Camerer and Thaler (1995). 
 
Most experimental studies indicate offers are almost never above 50 percent and the average offers are in 
the 25 – 50 percent range. Responders have shown themselves most likely to reject ungenerous offers, particularly 
those less than 20 percent of the lottery. Also the evidence indicates that the probability of rejecting offers tends to 
decrease with increasing offers.
3
 The main conclusion in the literature thus has been that (at least within the context 
of the game) the rational self-interest model of decision-making fails: individuals do not act to maximize their own 
economic well being.  
 
An explanation provided by the literature is that individuals have preference structures defined not only 
over their own well being but also over fairness considerations. Rabin (1993) and recently Falk and Fischbacher 
(2006) developed a model of reciprocity in which fair intentions are rewarded while unfair ones are punished. In 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), individuals are modelled as caring about fairness through an aversion towards what they 
call self-centered inequality.
4
  
 
 The aim of the present paper is to examine the income distribution and level arising from the basic 
ultimatum game and to compare those outcomes with counterparts arising from the game when there is a re-
distributional mechanism in place. In the next sections, we present the results of the game without a re-distribution 
policy, followed by the results with such a policy in place.  We conclude with discussion of our findings. 
 
THE CLASSROOM GAME WITHOUT A TAX/TRANSFER SYSTEM 
 
 On October 13th 2006, seventeen pairs of microeconomics principles students participated in a one-round 
combined ultimatum and dictator game with a $10 lottery allocation. The dictator game was played implicitly by 
having the proposers asked to record on their earnings sheets the offers they would make if responders, instead of 
being allowed to reject offers, were forced to accept any decision made by the proposer.  Responders were not told 
this question was being asked, and proposers were aware that was the case.  Table 1 summarizes offers: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 For a literature review see Fehr and Schnidt (1999). 
4  See also Andreoni and Miller (2001), and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997). 
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Table 1:  Mean, Median and Mode Offers 
Statistics Ultimatum Game Dictator Game 
Mean Offer $3.70 $1.35 
Mode 4.00 0.00 
Median 4.00 1.00 
Minimum 2.00 0.00 
Maximum 6.00 3.00 
 
 
 The mean offer in the ultimatum game was $3.70 (median $4.00) while in the dictator game it was $1.35 
(median $1).
 
 The two population means were significantly different at the one percent level.   
 
The difference in the averages between the two games represents the extra price proposers were prepared to 
pay for fear of being rejected, and thus is in effect a risk premium; see Forsythe et al. (1994).  The fact that Figure 1 
shows a payoff matrix in which the cooperative solution is in fact selected by the proposer of course means that the 
conventional model of consumer choice under conditions of certainty does not necessarily provide the appropriate 
predictions of utility-maximizing behaviour. 
 
Further, since proposers might have been induced to offer more than allowable minimum either by internal 
fairness considerations or by external social pressures, whether outcomes would be different if responders were 
informed about the nature of the dictator game (and proposers in turn were told that responders would be made 
aware) is a potentially fruitful area for further investigation.  Hoffman et al (1994) found in a double-blind 
framework where both subject-subject and subject-experimenter were anonymous that the dictator game generated a 
higher level of self interest, suggesting that the possibility of social pressure deserves to be taken seriously. List 
(2007) allowed dictators to take money from the other player and the experiments indicated that fewer participants 
are willing to give money away providing support to the self interest model. A further possibility to be considered, 
of course, is that despite the instructions, game-players implicitly see themselves participating in one component of 
a multi-period sequence of games. Figure 2 shows the histograms for the two games.  
 
 With knowledge of the ten dollar windfall, responders were asked to identify minimum acceptable offers; 
that is, amounts below which they would choose to reject the offer. Table 2 shows the results.  
 
 
Table 2:  Statistics on Acceptable Offers5 
Statistics on Ultimatum Game 
Mean Acceptable Offer $3.72 
Mode 4.00 
Median 4.00 
Minimum 2.00 
Maximum 5.00 
 
 
 The mean minimum acceptable offer was $3.72, almost identical to the mean offer recorded in Table 1. 
Combining offer and acceptance responses, two offers exceeded 50 percent and both were accepted. Seven offers 
were in the 40 – 49 percent range and only one of these was rejected.  Finally, there were eight offers of less than 40 
percent, half of which were rejected.  No offers were for less than 20 percent.  Overall, then, five out of seventeen 
offers (29 percent) were rejected by responders.   
 
 
 
                                                 
5 These results are slightly biased in the upwards direction because the responders were aware of the offer when answering the 
question on their minimum acceptable offer. However, proposers were not aware that responders were being asked to identify 
minimum acceptable offers.  
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The average earnings for a proposer is a combination of the earnings of those being rejected and thus 
earning nothing and those whose earnings are net of the offer of the accepted proposals. While the responder‟s 
average earnings are the total earnings/offers that are accepted plus zero for those who rejected the offers. 
Ultimatum game proposers on average earned $4.29 (the sum of their earnings divided by number of proposers) 
with responders earning an average of $2.76.  In the dictator game, proposers‟ average earnings were almost double 
at $8.65, while the responders‟ were approximately halved at $1.35.  In the aggregate, one can observe a substantial 
loss in total wealth in the ultimatum game, since the average per-game earnings in the ultimatum setting were $7.06, 
while under dictatorial conditions they were ten dollars.   
 
Application of the Potential Pareto criterion to the above results would of course indicate clear superiority 
of dictatorship.  However, given the widely differing income distributions emerging from the two scenarios it is by 
no means certain a collective (societal) sense of fairness would not lead to the judgement that the more equal 
distribution of income would be preferable despite the lower average earnings of group members. 
 
The initial value of the potential payouts totalled $170 ($10 times 17 pairs of students.)  In the dictator 
game, the total was constrained to remain at $170, while in the ultimatum game it fell to $120 ($7.06 times 17) 
because rejected offers yielded nothing to either party.  The difference between these outcomes represents a huge 
sacrifice of the total value of the economic pie. 
 
Although the motives of responders – who, after all, are in effect hoping to receive a larger rather than a 
smaller free lunch – remain a matter for debate, one plausible explanation of their behaviour is that when faced with 
an offer considered unfair, they resolve in a version of tit-for-tat strategy to bring the proposer – an otherwise 
identical counterpart with the good fortune to have been a proposer rather than a responder – to the same income or 
social class to which the responder will belong with the rejection. 
 
Figure 3 shows graphically the income distributions resulting from the ultimatum and dictator games, the 
equal-income case, and the setting in which individuals receiving the initial endowments are allowed to keep those 
endowments without transferring any funds to others.  The solid line shows the income distribution in an initial 
allocation in which half of the subjects receive 10 dollars and the other half receive nothing. The initial distribution 
consists of those that have (given the randomness of the game, the lucky) and those that have not (the unlucky).  The 
dashed line shows the income distribution given perfect equality (everyone is given 5 dollars) while the dotted line 
shows the ultimatum game results and the final mixed dot and dash line shows the result of the dictator game.  
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It is apparent from Figure 3 that the income distribution improves in both the ultimatum and in the dictator 
game relative to the initial income distribution.  Furthermore, one can observe from the figure that there are more 
individuals receiving nothing in the ultimatum game than the dictator game. Ten individuals earned nothing in the 
ultimatum game while only four people earned nothing in the dictator game, although two additional individuals 
were given one cent each in the dictator game.  
 
To quantify and compare the degrees of inequality we use the Gini coefficient, defined in the traditional 
way as the ratio of the two areas in the unit box.  The area between the perfect equality of the lottery (the area below 
the dashed line when each individual is initially allocated 5 dollars) and the area above the line in each respective 
case (Area A) relative to the area below the perfect equality line (i.e., Area = A+B = 0.5). The area below the perfect 
equality line (i.e. A+B) is equal to 0.5 by construction. The Gini coefficient thus lies in the 0 – 1 interval.  A zero 
coefficient implies perfect equality, while a coefficient equal to unity would imply perfect inequality (all wealth in 
the hands of a single individual.)  Table 3 presents the Gini coefficients for the four alternatives.  
 
 
Table 3:  Gini Coefficients under Alternative Cases 
Case Gini Index 
Perfect Equality 0.00 
Ultimatum Experiment 0.41 
Dictator Experiment 0.43 
Initial Case 0.50 
Perfect Inequality 1.00 
 
 
 Two particular results are worth mentioning.  First, the income distribution under both games improves in 
terms of reducing inequality relative to the initial allocation.  Nevertheless, the resulting distributions do not 
approach the case of perfect equality even though this was a possibility with each proposer offering five dollars and 
each responder accepting.  Second, the income distribution resulting from the ultimatum game is only slightly more 
equal than in the dictator game.  Thus, the ability to reject offers does little to improve
6
 the income distribution.  
Furthermore, the reduction in efficiency relative to the dictator game is large since there is almost a thirty percent 
loss in output. 
                                                 
6  In general, of course, there is no justification for deeming a more equal distribution of wealth preferable to an unequal one, 
particularly if it is achieved by redistributional means.  In the game situation, however, where the parties gain wealth and become 
rich(er) or poor(er) entirely by chance, that perspective is surely appropriate.  
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THE GAME WITH A TAX/TRANSFER SYSTEM 
 
 In this section we consider ultimatum and dictator game behavior with a social justice system in place.  In 
this second experiment we force a re-distribution amongst the parties involved.  To begin the game, the 
experimenter (the social planner) announces that the lottery will be given to the proposer but informs both proposers 
and responders that under an enforceable tax/transfer scheme, a proportion of the windfall will automatically be 
transferred to the responders.   
 
It seems reasonable to expect that with informed players if the policy was for an equal split of the initial 
allocation there would be no offers made by proposers and no rejections by responders, and that the same choices 
would follow if the tax rate were in excess of one half.  Thus, transfer schemes involving transfer of less than fifty 
per cent are the ones of practical interest. 
 
The game is then played with the post-tax lottery in the same way as before.  The responder could again 
accept or reject the offer and in the case of rejection, neither party would receive any payout.  This implies that 
responders have the power to reject the tax/transfer or social justice system along with the offer.  In cases where the 
responder accepts the offer, s/he gets the transfer plus the offer while the proposer get to keep the after-tax lottery 
minus the offer. 
 
In the modified dictator game, the responder must accept whatever offer is made and cannot reject the 
social transfer policy that has been enforced upon him.  The dictator game was once again played implicitly by 
asking proposers to secretly to record on their earnings sheets the amounts they would offer to the responder from 
after tax dollars if there was no possibility that the offer would be rejected.  
 
On October 30
th
 2006 another seventeen pairs of microeconomics principles students participated in a one-
round ultimatum and dictator game, again with an initial $10 lottery allocation but this time with a thirty percent 
tax/transfer scheme.  Table 4 presents comparative outcomes:  
 
 
Table 4:  Mean, Median and Mode Offers with and without Tax System 
 
 
Ultimatum Game 
Without Taxes 
Ultimatum Game 
With Taxes 
Dictator Game 
Without taxes 
Dictator Game 
With taxes 
Mean Offer $3.70 $1.82 $1.35 $0.62 
Mode $4.00 $2.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Median $4.00 $2.00 $1.00 $0.25 
 
 
 The mean offer in the modified ultimatum game was $1.82 (median $2.00) while in the dictator game the 
average offer was $0.62 (median $0.25). As expected, the mean, mode and median offers all were lower with a re-
distributive tax/transfer system in place relative to the case without such a system.  However, there were now only 
two offers rejected out of seventeen offers made, presumably because rejection meant not only the sacrifice of the 
offer itself but of the thirty per cent transfer. The overall effect was a rejection rate less than half the 29 percent rate 
in the previous case and a sizeable gain in wealth relative to the case without tax/transfer. Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of offers with a tax/transfer scheme in place. 
 
 Proposers on average earned $4.44 compared with $4.29 in the previous case without a re-distribution 
system, while responders earned on average $4.38 versus $2.76 without the tax/transfer system. Thus, both earned 
on average more than the case without the tax/transfer system but responders gained significantly more.   
 
In the dictator game, the proposers‟ average earnings now were $6.38, a decline from $8.65 in the absence 
of a tax/transfer arrangement, while responders received $3.62 compared with $1.35.  Thus, the effect of the three 
dollar tax was to reduce offers by an average of less than one dollar, suggesting either that a fairness explanation 
requires substantial qualification or greater attention might be paid to the rejection-risk premium.  
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In the aggregate there remained an aggregate loss of wealth in the ultimatum game since average earnings 
in the ultimatum game summed to $8.82, while in the dictator game there was (could be) no loss of output. 
 
In sum, the same qualitative results are observed in this case as in the previous version of the game. There 
is a reduction in inequality even with a tax/transfer system in place due to the generosity – or perhaps risk aversion – 
on the part of the proposers.  The reduction in inequality is not as large as the previous case since the tax/transfer 
system does most of the reduction of inequality. Furthermore, the income distribution of the ultimatum game 
marginally improves in relation to the dictator game again in this case as was the case in the previous system. 
 
 Table 5 shows the Gini index under the new rules. 
 
 
Table 5: Gini Coefficient under the Different Cases 
Case Gini Index 
Perfect Equality 0.00 
Ultimatum Experiment 0.172 
Dictator Experiment 0.179 
Initial Case with 7 – 3 distribution 0.200 
Perfect Inequality 1.00 
 
 
 Clearly, the degree of inequality has been reduced from the interval [0.4 – 0.5] in the case where the re-
distribution was left to the public‟s generosity (or guilt, or social pressure) to a level of [0.17 – 0.20] with a 
governmental re-distributional policy. The reduction in inequity under a system with a tax/transfer scheme in place 
comes with a smaller loss in wealth relative to the system without such a scheme.  
 
It is important to note the responder had the power to reject the offers and the tax/transfer system imposed 
on him by the external body if he deemed the overall impact as unfair. However, rejection occurred less often than 
in the previous case and hence there was less output sacrifice associated with a reduction in inequality.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Let us assume that individuals care about equity and the proposer and responder have utility functions as 
those developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Individuals get direct utility from monetary payoffs but also get 
disutility from inequity. Individuals dislike perceived inequitable outcomes and are willing to sacrifice some of the 
monetary payoff to reduce this inequity. Fehr and Schmidt assume that inequity aversion is self-centered implying 
that people care only about how their monetary payoff deviates from others and not about the inequity that exists 
among the other people. The proposer‟s utility is given below: 
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0,RyPyMaxP0,PyRyMaxpPyPU   
<1> 
 
Where Py  is the money kept by the proposer, Ry is the money accepted by the responder. Assuming the proposer 
offers a share s of one dollar to the responder, the former will get utility, provided the latter accepts the offer, equal 
to: 
 
0,s21MaxP0,1s2Maxps1PU   
<2> 
 
 The first term in the above utility is the direct benefit that accrues to the proposer given that the responder 
accepts the offer. The second term measures the disutility from what Fehr and Schmidt call disadvantageous 
inequity. This disutility to the proposer arises when responder gets a larger share than one half of the share, namely 
when:. 01s2PyRy  . This rarely happens in experimental games. The last term is the disutility from 
advantageous inequity. Here the disutility arises when the share that the proposer keeps is greater than the 
responder‟s share of the pie: 0s21RyPy  . It is also assumed that Pp  implying that the loss is 
greater from disadvantageous relative to the advantageous inequity. Finally it is assumed that 01 P   ruling 
out the possibility of getting utility from advantageous inequity. The responder‟s utility is symmetric and given as 
follows if the offer s is accepted: 
 
0,1s2P0,s21MaxRsRU   
<3> 
 
 Fehr and Schmidt solve for the equilibrium outcome of the above problem assuming the proposer knows 
the preferences of the responder.
7
 The equilibrium share is equal to 0.5 if and only if 5.0P  , the share will be in 
the interval  5.0),R('s
*
s   if 5.0P  , where 
R21
R
)R('s


 is the responder‟s minimum acceptable 
offer, and the share will equal )R('s   if 5.0P  . This equilibrium is defined in terms of the responder accepting 
offers.
8
  One can observe easily that the responder will reject any offer
R21
R
)R('ss


 .9 Given that 
rejections of positive offers are frequent leading to a loss to both parties and to a substantial loss in welfare, it would 
most probably imply that the proposers are miscalculating the R coefficient. Although this is possible if the 
preferences are not known to the proposer, it would be an interesting future area of research. Basically, what defines 
the existence of an equilibrium number of offers not being accepted requires further exploration. As our evidence 
indicates, many offers were rejected by the responder making both parties worse off.  
 
 Figure 5 illustrates the utility frontier assuming that 3.0P  (blue line), 5.0P  (black line) and 
1P   (green line). Assuming 3.0P  the frontier is the blue top line. The initial allocation yields a 0.7 utility 
to the proposer and the responder gets -0.5 utility. Moving towards the right along the frontier the share offered to 
                                                 
7 They also explore the case when preferences are not known. 
8 Proof is shown in Fehr and Schmidt. 
9 The minimum acceptable offer s is one where the utility of accepting offer is equal the alternative of getting nothing, namely 
when 0)s21(Rs)s(RU  . 
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the responder increases. This reduces the utility of the proposer and increases the utility of the responder.
10
 The 
equilibrium solution is for the proposer to offer 25 percent of the pie to the responder where the blue line crosses the 
zero value utility for the responder. The responder would reject any offer less than 25 percent since her utility would 
be negative and thus both parties would be driven to the origin (0,0). This rejection which is common in ultimatum 
games results in an efficiency loss. In the case where the proposer has dictatorial powers he will offer less than 25 
percent of the pie provided 5.0P  and in order to maximize his utility the proposer will keep all the pie to 
herself . This model breaks down in the case of dictatorial powers since it cannot explain positive offers being made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, in the self interest model the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium is for the proposer to offer 
0s  and the responder to accept this. But are all these equilibrium offers fair from a social prospective or only a 
subset of these? Let there exist a social welfare function were the social planner selects the share and maximizes the 
equal weight utilitarian function of the proposer and the responder. The social welfare is: 
 
Max U =     0,s21MaxPR0,1s2MaxRP1RUPU   
<4> 
 
 It is easy to observe that the above function is maximized when the share is half of the pie, 5.0
*
s  . 
Setting 0s21   yields social welfare equal to unity. If the share is set equal to s < 0.5 the social welfare is less 
than unity, same is true when s > 0.5. Furthermore, this socially optimal solution is independent of the individual 
parameters associated with inequality aversion. The social welfare outcome is to share equally the pie. Any other 
solution is not socially optimal. See frontier above. The social solution achieves both maximum total output and an 
egalitarian income distribution. This means that the private negotiations fail to achieve the optimal social solution 
even if fairness considerations are part of the utility of an individual. Individuals are still driven more by greed than 
by fairness considerations and thus cannot achieve the socially optimal solution. Except in a rare case where the 
individual has a parameter associated with advantageous inequality is equal to or greater than 0.5. The social justice 
system through a tax/transfer policy replaces the optimal solution to
*
s5.0
*
  and hence the optimal solution 
can be chosen by setting the tax rate equal to 0.5. 
 
 
                                                 
10 As the P increases and equals 0.5 the Proposer‟ utility is flat at 0.5 until the share equals 0.5 after which it starts dropping. 
As this parameter increases beyond 0.5 the proposer‟s utility starts lower than 0.5 and takes a positive slope which implies that 
his utility increases as the share offered increases until the share is equal to 0.5.  
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 The findings of this research are consistent with the existing large body of evidence. We find offers less 
than 40 percent were highly likely to be rejected. Offers over 40 percent were rarely rejected. Positive offers in the 
dictator game indicate that individuals assign some importance to fairness. However, we provide additional 
evidence. First, the dictator‟s distribution of income is more equitable than the initial distribution and surprisingly 
very similar to the ultimatum income distribution. Second, rejection of positive offers results in a huge sacrifice of 
the total value of the economic pie without a substantial fall in inequity. Third, the introduction of a tax/transfer 
policy results in a more equitable distribution of income and also a smaller loss of the economic pie. Finally, 
individuals rarely rejected the social justice re-distributive scheme, even though they had the power to do so in the 
game.   
 
What are the implications of our study? Many labour relation contract disputes are resolved by having a 
third party involvement such as mediator or an arbitrator. In the presence of the third party, rejections of offers and a 
strike are less likely to take place. In the political arena, the existence of the United Nation‟s reduces the chances of 
war or the outbreak of violence. The tax/transfer system does a better job in providing social justice than an 
individual‟s preferences with the addition of fairness considerations. In all these cases efficiency and equity move in 
the same direction. 
 
In conclusion, the ultimatum game needs to go beyond the issue of the reasons underlying the rejection of 
the self interest model and to provide a framework where more socially desirable outcomes are achieved. 
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